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ONCE IN JEROPARDY.
The maxim that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
life o- limb is as old in English law as Magna Charta itself.
It is a principle that comes to us from a time when cruel and
unusual punishments were conmmon. Cooley Const. Law 296-8,
This great

fundamental principle of reason and justice

is

deeply imbedded in the very foundations of the common law, as
one of its safeguards to protect human life.
If we reflect, that at

the time this maxim came

into exist-

ence almost every offense was punished ,withdeath or other
punishment touching the person, we can easily see the necessity for its existence, at that time, and how carefully it
has since been guarded down to the present period.
We believe that the criminal jurisprudence of every civilized
country recognized and adopted a similar provision.
It certainly existed in English law, and Blackstone

says:"It

is a universal maxim of the common law of England that no man
is to be brought

into jeopardy of his life more than once for

the same offense". Black. Com. 335.
The safeguard

is broader in its application than as stated by

Blackstone, for the two kindred maxims of the common law.
Nemo debet vexari pro una et eadem causa and Nemo debetbis
puniri pro uno delecto, these two maxims have long guarded

the rights of successful litigants in civil, and prevented
oppression in criminal, cases, not only

so far as life

is

concerned, but also with respect to property, limb and liberty . Brooms Legal Maxims 347-50.
We find a similar maxim in the civil law, non bis in idem,
which leads us to believe that the principle was at one time
universally recognized. Lactantius Inst. Div. bk 7 ch 8.
The English conmon law not only prohibited a second punishment for the same offense, but it went further and forbade a
second trial for the same offense, and thii to whether the
accused had suffered punishments or not, and whether in the
former trial a person had been acquitted or convicted.
In England this maxim of the common law, is a matter of practice that has flucuated and varied at different times and
which cannot now be regarded to-day as finally settled.
Rex. v. Winsor L.R. 1 Q.B. 289.
It matters but little with us as to the history of this great
principle, as we adopt it as our unbending rule, and to which
the decisions of our courts must conform. This rijit
glaranteed to the citizens of the United States
Const. Amend.

is

by the U.S.

Art. 5 and while this provision does not bind

the states, a question on which the authorities formerly differed, but which is now well settled: nearly all the American States have adopted similar provisions in their constitu-

tions, and even in those which do not have a similar provision, adopt and follow the principle as one fully establidhed
and settled at common law.
The question when a person on trial for a crime is first put
in jeopardy within the meaning of the constitutional guaranty is one upon which there has been some diversity of judic-al opinion. In Teat v State 53 Miss. 453 Chalmers.J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: "There are few questions in criminal law upon which the authorities are more irreconcilably at conflict than the one presented by these views
Without elaborating a question which has been so often and so
exhaustively discussed, we feel no hestation in announcing
our concurrence in that line of decisions which holds that a
person is placed in jeopardy, whenever, upon a valid indictment, in a court of competent jurisdiction, and before a legally constituted jury, his trial has been fairly entered upom;
and that if thereafter the jury is illegally, improperly, and
unnecessarily discharged by the court, it operates as an acquittal, so that he cannot thereafter be arraigned for the
same ofrenseg
Bishop says:"Without a jury, set apart and sworn for the particular case, the individual defendant has not been conducted to his period of jeopardy. But when according to the bet-

4
ter opinion, the jury being full, is sworn, and added to the
other branches of the court, and all preliminary things of
record are ready for trial, the prisoner has reached the jeopardy from the repetition of which our constitutional rule
protects him." Bishop Crim. Law I . 1015. These views are undoubtedly sustained by the

great weight of american authority

Cooley Const. Lim. 327. Hines v State 24 Ohio St 134. King v
People 5 Hun 297 O'Brian v Com. 9 Bush 333. People v Cage 48
Cal. 323.Joy v State 14 Ind. 139. Adams v State 99 Ind. 244.
State v Redman 17 Iowa 323. Alexander v Com. 105 Pa. St. 1.
McFadden v Com. 23 Pa. St. 12. Whitmore v State 43 Ark. 271.
State v Davis 31 West Va. 390. State v Stewart 4 Pac. Rep. 12J
Grogan v State 44 Ala. 9. In re Spier 1 Dev. 491.
Another view is that jeopardy begins only after verdict.
People v Goodwin 18 Johns. 187. United States v Gilbert

2

Sumn. 19.
This is the view taken by the United States Supreme Court
and also of the courts of New York Texas. Miss. and some othes
United States v Perez 9 Wheaton 579. Taylor v State 35 Texas
97. Pizano v State 20 Texas App. 139. Brink v State 18 Texas
App. 344.
This view is strongly combatted by Bishop, who says: There
are a few cases in which it is laid iown, at least in dicta,

that the jeopardy begins only after verdict rendered. The
meaning of the constitution, it is said, is that no man shall
be twice tried for the same offense. But the adljudications,
even of these judges hardly sustain this proposition and the
difference between the danger, or jeopardy of a thing

and

the thing itself, indicates the error on which these observations proceed. Indeed thus to substitute a word
titution for the word in it,
ties. Bishop Crim. Law I.

in the cons-

is to take with it great liber-

1018.

In the case of the People v Hunckler 48 Cal. 334. McKinstryJ.
says:"A defendant is placed in apparent jeopardy when he is
placed on trial before a competent court and a jury impanelled and sworn. His jeopardy is real, unless it shqll appear
that a verdict could never have been rendered, by reason of
the death or illness of the judge, or a juryman, or that after
due deliberation the jury could not agree, or by reason of
some other like overruling necessity which compelled their
discharge without the consent of the defendant."
This

is a clear and concise statement of the correct

doctrine,

notwithstanding there are authorities to be found to the
cont-ar, both in the decisions of the courtl, and in the
text

books on criminal law.

Former jeopardy

is everywhere admitted to be a complete de-

fense, and being in jeopardy of an included offense constitutes such a jeopardy, as is a bar to a prosecution on an indictinent for the

ejroater crime.

There are many different exrressiins by which courts state
the rule as to when jeopardly begins? and they differ only in
form of expression, their effect being the same. Thus jeopardy begins whenever the jury has been sworn to try rhe cause.
Kingen v State 46 Ind.

132 When the accused has pleaded to
Com. v

the indictment, and the jury sworn to try the cause.
Cook 6 Serg.& Rawle 577. State v Redman 17 Iowa 329.

When the case is submitted to the jury, and the case is submitted to the jury when the prisoner is arraignea, and the
plea entered.
Where one is put upon his trial upon a valid indictment,

for

a eapita; offense. It may result in his condemnation, and
hence he is in jeopardy. Weinzorpflin v State 7 Black. 191.
Where the indictment

is good, and the jury are charged with

the prisoner he is undoubtely in jeoa-lu dL'ing

i

delio-

eration. Whenever a person shall have been given in charge on
a legal indictment. Wright v State 5 Ind. 292.
In this country it may be generally said that the moment a
full jury is impanelled and all have been sworn, from that
moment his jeopardy contemplated by the constitution begins.

McFadden v Corn. 23 Pa.St.12.
But sorie

judges have said that a person was not placed in

jeopardy until

ther has been a verdict, and also a judg-

ment of the court upon it dictum of Washington.J., in U.S.v .
Haskell 4 Washington 402.
But the fact that after a jury is once impanelled and sworn,
even before verdict rendered, a prosecuting officer has

no

right to enter a nolle prosequi, a principle now everywhere
admitted shows that a prisoner is in jeopardy before the jury
have been delivered of their verdict.
In determining this question whether or not a prisoner has
been in jeopardy so as to prevent his again being placed on
trial for the same offense it

is highly important to ascer-

tain for what causes a jury may be

legally discharged after

they have been sworn and charged with the deliverance of the
defendant. For if in a particular case the jeopardy has

at-

tached, though for an instant only, and there is afterwards
such a lapse in the proceedings as requires a new jeopardy
in distinction from the old, to procure a conviction,
defendant has thereby obtained the right to demand his

the
dis-

charge: and neither can the proceedings be carried on against
further or new proceedings be instituted, because he cannot
brought twice in jeopardy.

Cooley Const. Lim. 326. Bishop Crim. Law I. 1016. O'Brian v
Com. 9 Bush 333.
In examining this subject we may group the cases into

two

general classes. First where any separation cf the jury except

in case of absolute necessity, such as may be considered

the act of God is a bar to all subsequent proceedings.
Secondly where

it

is held that the discharge of the jury

is

a matter of discretion for the court, and when rightfully
exercised it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense.
The first group includes Pennsylvania, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Indiana.
In Pennsylvania this question of jeopardy was brought before
the supreme court in 1822 in the case of Com. v. Cook 6 Serg.
& Rawle 577.It will be well to remember that the
tional provision of that State

constitu-

is exactly the same as that of

U.S. In this case the defendant pleaded a special plea that
the jury had been discharged on a former trial because they
were unable to agree, this was against the consent of the
defendant. The court held, that the discharge of a jury,

be-

cause they were unable to agree was unlawful, Tilghman C.J.
admitted that in cases of absolute necessity the jury may be
discharged, but mere inabiliry to

agree is not such necessi-

ty. If a person had been tried on an invalid indictment and
has been acquitted he may be tried again, because the court

could no have given judgment against him if he had been convicted. In 1831 4 case where the defendant interposed a similar plea, the same court carried the doctrine of the above
case still further. Gibson C.J., argued that no discretionary
power whatever exists with the court to discharge a jury.
Why it

should be thought that the citizen has no other

assur-

ance than the arbitrary discretion of the magistrate, for the
enforcement of the constitutional principle that protects him
from being twice put

in jeopardy of life or limb or member

for the same offense I am loss to imagine. If the discretion
is to be called

in, there can be no remedy for the most pal-

pable abuse of it, but an interposition of the power to pardon which ip obnoxious to the very same objection. Surely ev
every right secured by the constitution is guarded by sanctions more imperative. But in those States where the principl
has no higher sanction than that derived from the common law,
it

is nevertheless the birthright of the citizen and demand-

able as such. But a right which depends upon the will of the
magistrate

is essentially no right at all: and for this rea-

son the common law abhors the exercise of a discretion in
matters that may be subjected to fixed and definite rules I
take it on grounds of reason as well as authority, then, that
a prisoner, of whom a jury have been discharged before ver-

diet iiven,

may by pleading the

circumstance

er trial, appeal from the order of thlr

in

bar of anoth-

court before which he

stood, to the hilghest tribunal in the land, nor do I understand how he shall be said not

to have been in jeopardy

be-

fore the jury have returned a verdict of acquittal. In the
legal as well as in the popular sense, he is

in jeopardy the

instant he called to stand upon his defense: for from

that

moment every movement of the comnonwealth is an attack

on

his life:- and he not put out or jojoardy unless by verdict
of acquittal. If the prisoner has been illegally deprived of
his means of deliverance from jeopardy, every dictate of justice requires that he be placed on ground as

favorable

as

he could have possibly have attained by the most fortuate
determination of his chances. Com. v. Ciu
In

ti__'

C3-

1

of' C m.

v Fitz a.tricy,

±2-.

3 Rav±e

Pa.St.

109.

97.

The prison-

er was indicted for murder, a trial waz had and the case submitted to the jury, the jury was unable to agree, and after
comeing into court repeatedly were discharged, against the
objection of the defendant. At the next term of court the
case was again called for trial, a special plea was interposed. The court held following the earlier cavethat the defendant had been once placed in jeopardy and could not be tried

11.

ajain for the same offense. The supreme court of Tennessee in
Mahala v State 10 Yert.

532 fully adopted the rule of the

Pennsylvania cases. The defcndant wa3 on trial for murder,
and the jury retired to :eliberate about two o'clock P.M. they
came into court several times

in the afternoon, declaring

they could not agree, but they were sent back, and kept together all night. About nine o'ocloek next morning, haiing
come into court, they informed the judge that it was impossible for them ever to agree, whereupon they were discharged
but such

discharge was afterwards held erroneous. The reason-

ing of the cases in Pennsylvania say the court, is to our
mindz entirely satisfactory. If a moral impossibility, constitutes a case of necessity, it is manifest that the decision of the zxx:k inferior court can never be reversed. How
san the superior court know whether the jury have agreed or
not, and how long shall the infer~or court be compelled

to

keep the jury together, before it shall be warranted in saying, that they cannot possibly agree? Shall it be an hour, a
week, or a month? Upon the whole, the power of discharging a
jury against the consent of the defendant, is of such a dangereous character, that we hesitate not in saying that

it

should not be exercised by the courts, when the jury cannot
agree on a verdict, unless they be prevented by a physical

12.
impossibility, and that when such impossibility does exist,
the

jury should be kept together until the court is about to

adjourn, when of necessity they must be discharged.
The second group includes those States in which the dischar, e
of the jury, when it takes place in the exerciae of a sound
discretion is not a bar to a second trial.
This is the view taken by the United States Supreme Court
and of the Courts of New York Massachusetts and some others.
Said Washington Jo

in a case where the jury, on a homicide

trial had been discharged in consequence of the alleged

in-

sanity of one of them."That although the court may di*charge
in cases of misdemeanors, they have no such authority in capitaX cases. We are clearly of the opinion that the jeopardy
spoken of in this article of the U.S.

Const. can be

interre-

ted to mean nothing short of the acquittal or conviction of
the prisoner, and the judgment of the court thereupon.
This was the meaning affixed to the expression by the common
law, notwithstanding some loose expressions to be found in
the decisions

of some courts. United States v.

Haskell 4

Washington 409.
In the eupreme Court of the United qtates this subject was
brought up in 1824., upon a certificate of division in the

13.
opinions of the judges of the Circuit Court for the Southern
District of New York.
The jury were discharged

in the court below on

account

of

mere disagreement.
The question arises, whether the discharge of the jury
the court from giving a verdict upon the indictment,

by
with

which they were charged, without the consent of the prisoner,

is a bar to any future trial for the same offense#

If it be, then he is entitled to be discharged from custody:
if not then he ought to be held in

imprisonment until such

trial can be had, we are of the opinion that the facts constitute no legal bar to - further trial.The prisoner has not
been convicted or acquitted, and may again be put upon his
defense. We think in all cases of this nature, the law has
invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge
a jury from giving any verdict whenever, in theifopinion,
taking all the circumstances

into consideration, there

is a

manifes necessity for the act, or the ends of justice
would be defeated. They are to exercise a sound discretion
on the subject: and it

s ir.ossible

to define all the cir-

cumstances, and for very plain obvious reasons and in capital
case courts should be especially cautious how they interfere
with any of the rights in favor of the prisoner. But after all

14.
they have the right to order the discharge: and the security which the public have for the faithful sound, and conscientious exercise of this discretion, rests

in this as

in other

cases, upon the responsbility of the judges und_r their
oaths of 2m:

office.

We are aware that there
tice on this subject,

is some diversity of opinion and prac-

in the American Courts, but after weigh-

ing the question with due deliberation, we are of the opinion that such a discharge constitutes no bar to a further
proceedings, and gives no right of exemption to the prisoner
from being again put on trial".
United States V. Perez 9 Wheaton 579.
-And while this case has been frequently cited and approved
as an authority, it certainly rests upon debatable ground,
as the facts

show that the jury were

discharged within half

an hour after they had retired to deliberate upon thdir verdiet. This particular case has been widely conmented on and
ariticised, and

its authority has been weakened, if not en-

tirely overruled by the case of Ex partie Lang 18 Wallace 163.
In our own State of New YOrk a person is not placed in jeopardy until a verdict has been rendered. This at least seeme to
be deducible from the

authorities.

15.
In the case of The People v Goodwin 18 Johns. 187. The defendant was

indicted for manslaughter, the jury after a trial

of five days, and after, being kept together to consider of
their verdict for seventeen hours, declared that there was
no possibility of their agreeing on a verdict, and it being
within half an hour of the time when the court was bound to
close its session the jury were discharged, and the prisoner
again tried at another court.
Spencer C.J., says:"Upon full consideration I am of the opinion that, although the puwer of discharging a jury is a delicate andh

highly important trust, yet, it

does exist

cases of' extreme and absolute necessity: and that

in

it may be e

exercised without operating as an acquittal of the defendant:
that

it extends ta

well to felonies as misdemeanors, and

that itax±xkK exists and may be discreetly exercised in cases
where the jury, from the length of time they have been considering a cause, and their inability to agree, unless compelled
so to do from the pressing calls of famine or bodily exhaustion, and in the present case,

considering the great length

of time the jury had been out, that the period for which the
court could legally sit, was nearly terminated, and that it
was morally certain the jury could not agree before the

16.
court must adjourn, I think the exercise of the power

was

discreet and legal. Much stress has been placed on the fact
that the defendant was in jeopardy during the time the jury
were deliberating. It is true that his situation was critical and there was as, regards him danger, that the jury might
agree on a verdict of guilty, but

in a legal sensen he was

not !n jeopardy, so that it would exonerate him from a second
trial. He has not been tried for the offense imputed to him,
to render the trial complete and perfect, there should have
been a verdict either for or against him. A literal observance of thi

cases where by the visitation of God one of the

jurors should either die, or beco.' uterly unable to proceed
in the trial. It would extend, also to a case where the defendant himself should be seized with a fit and become

inca-

pable of attending to his defense: and it would extend to a
case where the jury were

..acessarily discharged in conse-

quence of the termination of the powers of the court.
In alegal sense therefore, a defendant

is not put in jeopardy,

until the verdict of the jury is rendered for or against him,
and if for or against him, he can never be drawn in question
again for the same offense

"

.

In the case of Sheppard v people 25 N.Y. 406.

Sheppard vT&s

indicted for arson in the first degree a trial was had, and

17.
the jury found him guilty of the offense. The court held that
a judgment having been rendered against the defendant that
was irregular that he could not be subjected to another trial
but should be discharged, and this though the defendant had
in a motion in arrest of judgment had asked for a new trial.
Sutherland J., says:"The circumstance, that the counsel of
the prisoner, on moving in arrest of judgment, also asked for
a ne-y trial, I regard of no consequence. The constitutional
provision is."No person shall he subject to be twrice

put in

jeopardy for the same offense". New York Const. Art. I Sec.6.
This provision may be considered as addressed to courts: and,
if the prisoner is within its protection, he ought to be discharged, although his counsel did formally ask for a new
trial".
Gardiner v People 6 Parker 155. Holds that a prisoner may
be tried on a second indictment after a nolle prosequi

or

supersedeas of the first indictment, to which a plea to the
jurisdiction had been overruled, on the merits, and does not
place the defendant in jeopardy a second time.
People v Comstock 8 Wend. 549.
A new trial cannot be had where the prisoner has been acquitted. Nor will a writ of error lie at the suit of the people
after judgment for the dofendant

in

a criminal c' se.

13.
People v Corning 2 M.Y. 9. But under the act of 1863 the judg
ment may be corrected.
Hu33y v People 47 Barb. 503.

The prisoner by obtaining a noc.-T

trial waives his constitutional ri6Jit to the plea of once in
jeopardy and riay again be tried

a

second time for th.e same

offense.
People v Ruloff 5 Parker 77. Where*

a person has been put on

trial, a juror cannot be withdrawn without his consent.
People v Barrett 2 Caines Cas.

304. Grant v People 4 Parker

527. Klock v People 2 Parker 676. An arrest of judgent after
conviction for felony is not abar to a second indictment..
People v Casbourns 13 Johns. 351. In cases of ,isdemeanor the
court may discharge

the jury without the consent of the de-

fendant and he may be tried

again for the same offanse.

People v Denton 2 Johns Cas. 275. A prisoner is not put

in

jeopardy where the evidence fails to establish the offense
charged. Canter v People 1 Abb. Dec. 305.
A conviction for an assualt and battery is no bar to an indictment for murder, where the assualted person subsequently
dies from the effect of the blows. Burns v People 1 Parker
182.

In the case of Hartung v People 26 N.Y. 167 The defend-

ant was tried and convicted of murder, the law as it then ex-

19.
isted was changed and a new law enacted, governing the punishment of that crime. The court held, that the prisoner
could not be tried again, nor be executed under a re-enactment of the old law. Denio C.J., said"The general rule as is
well known, is that

if a person has been once tried and con-

victed or acquitted he may plead such prior acquittal

or

conviction upon a subsequent arraig'nment for the same offense.
These would be good

pleas at

common law, and the constitu-

tien only affirms the principle and renders it unalterable
by any, exertion of the law making power. But it does not apply where the

indictment was so defective, that no lawful

judgment could be rendered upon it,

as in the case of a mis-

trial, as where there was no venire, or where the trial jury
did not consist of the full number of twelve
In this and other cases of the same nature
that the accused never was

jurors".

it may be said

in legal jeopardy.

In the case of People v Palmer 109 N.Y. 413. The defendant
Palmer was indicted for assualt in the first degree,

and

upon his trial convicted for assualt in the third degree, he
appealed from this judgment and obtainoL a reversal for errors
in the trial the court held that he should be tried again for
assualt in the first

degree, and not simply of the lesser

20.
grade of which he had been convicted.
The provisions of our Code of Criminal Procedure Sections
333, 339 relating to pleas

only contemplate a plea of 6uilty

or not guilty, or of former conviction or acquittal of the
offense charged, or of any matter of fact that tends to establih a defense of the crime charged, and with us the facts
of former jeopardy, where there has been no conviction

or

acquittal should be given in evidence under a plea of not
guilty, as a matter tending to establish a defense.
Thus we see that it is everywhere admitted that there exists
causes for which a judge may discharge a jury, and thus compell the defendant to submit to another trial.
This is contrary to the

early English law, as there was at

one time an ancient tradition among English lawyers that a
jury once charged in a capital case could not be discharged
without rendering a verdict either for or against the prisoner, even with the consent of the prisoner and the attorney
general. This rule is

laid down and supported by so eminent

an authority as Lord Coke Coke's Inst.
the same rule

in

Hale's

110. 2276. We find

Summary of the Ploas

of the Crown.

In the case of the two Kinlocks which occured in the year
1746 and reported in Fosters Crown Law 16. Mr Justice Foster

21.
in delivering the opinion says:

Ty Lord
1"'
Coke w s one of those

learned men who gave into tradition, as far, at least
concerneth capital cases;

as

and he layeth down the rule in very

general terms, but he hath not given us any of the principles
of law or reason whereon he groundeth it".
And in this case above cited it was held that

the court had

the authority to discharge a jury and thus subject the prisoner to another trial.
Thus we see that from an early date the courts possessed and
exercised the right to discharge a jury even in capital cases.
Among some of the causes in which it has been held proper
for courts to discharge a jury are the following:

Sicknes of

the judge. Misconduct, sickness or incapacity of a juror.
Sickness of the prisoner. Incapacity of a witness4 Expiration
of the term of court. And the inability of a jury to agree.
As to cases of necessity for which a court may discharge
jury there

a

is no middle ground, the court must determine

when such a necessity has arisen as will warrant it in discharging a jury either in a capital case, or in the

case of

a misdemeanor,or the rule must be absolute, that after a jury
are once sworn and charged, no other jury, can be in anY
event sworn in the same case.

22.
The moment we admit cases of necessity to form exceptions,
that moment Ne open a door to the discretion of the court to
judge of that necessity, and to determine from the facts and
surrounding-s of each case what combination of circumstances
will create one.
We see from the cases cited in this a-ticle that all the
a:j.ree
erson can only once be placed
authorities and cases that a p,
in,

jeopardy the only dispute being as to when that jeop-

ardy is full and complete so as to be taken advantage of by
the defendant*
We feel

no hestation in

adopting the rule of the

cases

in

Pennsylvania and Tennessee as being the one that is based on
authority as well as reason, and which is consistent not
only with our American form of government, but also as carrying out the ends of justice.
Owen L. Potter.

